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dapper and conservative, wearing for-
mal tails and neatly sculptured salt-
and-pepper coiffure - giving an ap-
pearance, however, which was thought 
in some circles to be somewhat less riske 
than the occasion called for. The rumor 
that Mr. Brown had not worn boots 
couk1 not be confirmed. 
Mr. Dennis Sweeney, current Chief 
Attorney of the Administrative Law Unit, 
also appeared at the counsel table. Al-
though it was originally thought that he 
was aiding Mr. Brown, close observation 
revealed that he did nothing at all. 
Gregory Norton - himself -
attended the hearing, despite a Balti-
more Sun report that he couldn't attend. 
(All of which goes to prove the danger of 
writing news stories in advance. A risk 
which this correspondent will never be 
accused of taking.) As it was, Joe "Wild 
Turkey" Rohr and Gordon "Madman" 
Berman, realizing that it was too late to 
get their names in the Sun, thought they 
might curry favor with the News Ameri-
can by driving Gregory Norton to 
Washington and provingtheSun wrong. 
This scheme failed. 
Gregory was qUietly attending school 
when these two arrived at the recreation 
yard and lured him into their car with 
tales of important doings in Washington. 
Although Gregory did not seem to un-
derstand the subtleties of the arguments 
on his constitutional claim on the merits, 
he seemed enraptured by the hour of 
debate on the jurisdictional issue. 
The Justices must be criticized for the 
lack of color and originality in their ap-
parel. How long the federal judiciary will 
continue to follow their lead in these 
matters is now an open question. One 
would have thought that the new year, 
and a new Justice, would have brought 
some bright new changes in the appear-
ance of the Court, but the minor varia-
tions on the same basic black midi are a 
real disappointment. 
• 
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U.S. Statutory Law 
by D. W. Lenehan 
In most situations where a U.S. indus-
try is exempted from our anti-trust laws, 
it tends to be closely scrutinized and di-
rectly accountable to a federal regulatory 
agency. But what happens when an in-
dustry is international in scope, and its 
very nature makes close scrutiny and di-
rect accountability impossible? This is 
the US. Maritime industry, vital to our 
national interest, yet extending well be-
yond the recognized boundaries of US. 
jurisdiction. It is not uncommon, for 
example, to find a ship, registered in 
Liberia and owned by a Greed consor-
tium, carrying German industrial goods 
between the Netherlands and the United 
States. The situation becomes even 
more complex when it is remembered 
that French, Italian and Scandinavian 
ships are also competing for the same 
cargo over the same routes. Where 
foreign ship owners mutually agree to 
"price-fixing" arrangements, how are 
US. owned ships to compete, effectively 
in view of US. anti-trust legislation? The 
brief answer is that they are exempted 
from this legislation through a transna-
tional application of US. maritime law. 
To understand this exemption, it is 
necessary to consider The Shipping Act 
of 1916, (46 U.s.c. 801 et. seq.) and in 
particular its sections which have the ef-
fect of regulating discriminatory prac-
tices in US. foreign Commerce. 
The main purpose of this act is to ar-
ticulate a scheme of government regula-
tion which has as its objective the preser-
vation of competition. This policy rests 
on the basic assumption that the pros-
perity of our foreign commerce and the 
maintenance of a strong and indepen-
dent merchant marine can best be se-
cured through strict administrative sur-
veillance of shipping practices, insistence 
on equal treatment for all shippers, pro-
tection of cargo and ports against unfair 
discrimination, and finally through pre-
vention of practices designed to elimi-
nate smaller independent carriers. At 
first glance, the terms of the act seem 
diametrically opposed to the end it seeks 
to achieve. 
Section 15 requires that every written 
or oral agreement between two or more 
steamship lines, which in any way fixes 
or regulates ocean freight rates, be filed 
with the Federal Maritime Commission. 
(It is important to note that the govern-
ment does not set foreign commerce 
rates, it merely accepts the rates for filing 
and requires that the line charge only the 
rate filed.) Any such agreement is made 
effective and lawful upon approval by 
the Commission. Indeed, the section 
explicitly states that any such approval 
exempts that activity from the provisions 
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
The activities that this legislation 
wished to protect in 1916 remain basi-
cally the same as are protected today. 
These are the unique transnational busi-
ness organizations known as steamship 
conferences. Each conference is a con-
tractually established cartel consisting of 
a number of steamship lines serving the 
same trade in the foreign commerce of 
the United States. Protected by Section 
15 of The Shipping Act, these confer-
ences have as their purpose the elimina-
tion of price competition and to that end 
possess a number of unusual powers. 
Among these are the power to fix rates 
by agreement (supra) and to enforce 
these agreements by boycotts, fines and 
expulsions of member lines. 
In addition to the conferences, several 
independent non-conference carriers 
are found in almost all U.S. trade routes. 
The act encourages their existence in 
order to give the conferences realistic 
competition and therefore influence the 
conference rate-making. These inde-
pendent carriers are also required to file 
ocean freight tariffs in the same manner 
as are the conferences. We, therefore, 
find a situation where the ostensible goal 
of a legislative enactment is to preserve 
competition in our foreign commerce 
while the method used to reach that end 
is the sanctioning of multi-national or-
ganizations authorized to fix ocean 
freight rates. 
This paradox confronted the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine & 
Fisheries around the turn of the century, 
and more recently, the Antitrust Sub-
committee of the House Judiciary 
Committee, when it conducted extens-
ive investigations of the Steamship Con-
ference System. Nevertheless, every 
government body which has come face 
to face with the economic and political 
realities of the steamship industry has 
reached the same conclusion: the 
Steamship Conference System is an ab-
solute necessity. 
This conclusion is derived from a re-
view of a recurring pattern that has re-
peatedly made itself evident to inves-
tigators and students of the industry. The 
steamship is a very expensive vehicle, 
manned by a large and expensive crew. 
Further, the recent advent of containeri-
zation, has necessitated a tremendous 
capital outlay for large and expensive 
cranes, as well as for a ground fleet of 
containers and chasis. Consequently, 
millions of dollars will be committed to a 
voyage before a liner loads a single ton 
of cargo into its holds or onto its decks. It 
should also be emphaSized that basic 
costs for the whole voyage are generally 
fixed and do not significantly fluctuate 
with the type or quantity of cargo car-
ried. As another writer has noted, 
"Prompt and certain disaster awaits the 
line that puts its ship on the loading berth 
and then fails to meet the fixed costs to 
which it is committed." The House re-
port of the 63rd Congress (1914) found 
that " ... the entire history of steamship 
agreements shows that in ocean com-
l11erce there is no happy medium be-
tween war and peace when several lines 
engage in the same trade. Most of the 
numerous conference arrangements 
were the outcome of rate wars and rep-
resent a truce between the contending 
lines." The committee concluded that 
the elimination of conferences would 
have either of two results: 
1) the stronger carrier would destroy 
the weaker, or 
2) to avoid a costly struggle, carriers 
would consolidate through com-
mon ownership. 
In either case, a worse monopoly would 
be created than, as we shall see, exists 
with the conference system. 
A close scrutiny of the House report 
discussing The Shipping Act discloses a 
pervasive notion that a judiciously 
applied regulatory scheme would ulti-
mately protect American shipping inter-
ests (and ultimately U.S. national inter-
ests) by creating an arena in which U.S. 
lines could compete fairly against foreign 
flag carriers. It also established that 
American importers and exporters are 
directly and adversely effected by unsta-
ble rate conditions. Generally, the small 
or medium sized shipper is the loser dur-
ing rate wars since the large shipper is 
normally the beneficiary of low-rate 
deals. However, both large and small 
lose because the inability to accurately 
predict freight rates results in Significant 
problems in establishing sale prices. 
The resolution of compulsive compe-
tition resulting in a monopoly of the 
strongest among land-based American 
industries such as railroads, communica-
tions and utilities was governmental 
price regulation. However, the basic fact 
of ocean shipping is that no single gov-
ernment can regulate ocean freight 
rates. No government controls more 
than one end of the journey, and only a 
fraction of the carriers are its nationals. 
Any regulation at one end of the journey 
would inevitably either drive carriers 
from the trade or more likely invite con-
tradictory and even relatiatory regula-
tion from the other. We have, chen, an 
industry which, without price regulation, 
cannot maintain the competitive viability 
both industry and our national interest 
require, yet which by its very nature 
cannot be directly regulated by anyone 
government. 
In terms of The Shipping Act the main 
problem arises in countries which have 
laws that prohibit the export of private 
business documents located within that 
country for the purpose of determining 
the basis for prosecution of their nation-
als in U.S. anti-trust matters. (It is the 
documentary evidence - the written 
word - which provides the raw infor-
mation needed to reach a judicial deter-
mination to confirm or refute an alleged 
violation.) In response to this situation, 
The Shipping Act created the disarm-
ingly simple solution of self-policing 
within the Conference System. While 
this is clearly not the whole answer, since 
the practices of independent carriers 
need to be regulated also, where, for 
example, they illegally attempt to disrupt 
the conference agreements by giving il-
legal rebates to shippers, the regulation 
of these independents follows a different 
path than does regulation of conference 
members. Suffice it to say that this is 
more in the area of diplomatic negotia-
tions than a direct transnational applica-
tion of U.S. law. 
Section 15 of The Shipping Act places 
the self-policing function, not only with 
the conference itself, but also with 
conference-appointed neutral bodies. 
APRIL, 1976 1351 
Under this device, conference self-
policing is effected through a permanent 
agency appointed by the conference it-
self to independently investigate and ad-
judicate all complaints of malpractice. 
These malpractices include all of the 
prohibited practices contained in The 
Shipping Act. The principal condition 
precedent to approval of the self-
policing arrangement is that the confer-
ence or the neutral body make periodic 
reports to the Federal Maritime Com-
mission describing all of its activities, in-
dicating the types of violations discov-
ered and the fines imposed. Conversely, 
another important feature of Section 15 
is that the Commission has the power to 
disapprove or suspend any conference 
agreement which does not practice 
adequate self-policing. (This was re-
cently referred to by the Commission 
Chairman as the basic "quid-pro-quo" 
of the U.S. sanctioning of the Confer-
ence System.) 
A look at the nature of the current 
neutral body for carriers operating be-
tween the United States and Europe, the 
u.K. and Ireland shows a clear analogy 
to a "Supranational" system. Its most 
obvious features are its multi-national 
composition and its ability to make deci-
sions that are directly binding on carriers 
without the intervention of govern-
ments. This latter feature is based on the 
theory of individual consent (by member 
lines) to conference actions derived from 
the contractual origin of the conference. 
The executive of the body, located in 
London, is appropriately called the en-
forcement authority. The body was 
created by an agreement approved by 
the U.S., and functions under a constitu-
tion and by-laws. The authority has the 
contractually established right to review 
and investigate all allegations of mal-
practices, and to examine all records re-
levant to any investigation regardless of 
where these documents are domiciled. 
Indeed the very refusal to cooperate in 
an investigation subjects a line to a 
$5,000 fine for each week the refusal 
continues. The authority may dismiss 
the charge or set it for hearing. After a 
hearing the authority serves on the ac-
cused line findings of fact and, if war-
ranted, specifies fines. Maximum fines 
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are $50,000 per violation, which must 
be paid within fifteen days after service 
of the authority's report. 
The neutral body system of the con-
ferences has created a desirable level of 
rate stability in most trades, primarily be-
cause here the interests of industry and 
government have converged to the 
mutual advantage of both. Each has ef-
fectively chosen to accept less than its 
optimum goal in return for assurances of 
stability and continued beneficial re-
turns. Shippers are assured of the pre-
dictable transportation rates essential to 
realistically establish sale prices. In re-
turn, they give up the possibility of lower 
but less predictable rates. In return for 
being spared the cut-throat competition 
that aims at their total destruction, indi-
vidual carriers give up some of their in-
i!lependence to the conference, and, 
with it, some of their increased profit po-
tential. Likewise, the government, by al-
lowing potential competitors to agree on 
charges, is effectively backing down on 
long standing principles of our anti-trust 
law. However, in this way, the U.S. is 
able to maintain the viability of her mer-
chant marine through a transnational 





by Robin Goodenough, 
Professor of Law and Licensed 
Psychologist 
1. SPREAD IT, DON'T HUMP IT, 
DON'T LUMP IT 
The longer the period of time over 
which you spread your learning, the bet-
ter it will stick. Budget it neatly in equal 
packages over the study period. Spread 
it out. Distributed learning is far more ef-
fective than marathon learning massed 
at the end. If you lump it, the lumps will 
be on you. 
2. YOUR MIND HAS UNLIMITED 
STORAGE, FILL IT 
What you know on the conscious level 
is only the "tip ofthe iceberg." Although 
the information is not on the tip of your 
tongue, much is lying in the subcon-
scious, alive and well and waiting to 
bubble up. You have a vast 
storehouse - feed it. It craves informa-
tion. It's never too late to add more. 
3. UP YOUR MEMORY CURVE 
The memory curve descends like a 
long, steep ski slope. Memory lingers 
briefly at the top with high recall. Then it 
slides into a steep plunge, leveling off at 
roughly ten per cent. HOWEVER, it 
takes very little effort to break the skid. 
Even brief reviews bolster the memory 
curve. A little effort gets you a lot of 
memory. Spaced reviews can keep re-
tention well over the fifty per cent mark. 
4. REVIEW PAYS OFF FOR YOU 
It pays handsomely to review right up 
to test time. Beware of the misinformed 
romanticist who urges you to take off a 
day or a week before exams. This' 'sal-
vation by relaxation" myth has no valid-
ity in learning. Just before exams let your 
eyes run over your outline or over the 
table of contents of your text. You may 
not feel much, but something wonderful 
is happening. Review BETWEEN 
exams. Post-mortems and bull sessions 
are counter-productive. A "once over 
lightly" review pays off. 
5. CRAM, CRAM, CRAM, RIGHT UP 
TO THE EXAM 
Cramming is very effective and has 
saved many a career. Cramming jams in 
new stuff and reinforces the old. Cram-
ming helps give a sense of confidence to 
counter the debilitating aura of guilt from 
weeks of procrastination. Remember, 
cramming is no substitute for planned 
and distributed learning. But if you can 
both budget your learning and slam 
home with a good cram job, you will 
break through a sure winner. 
6. ROUTINES REIGN SUPREME 
Set a' 'game plan" for yourself and fol-
low it faithfully. Layout the subject mat-
ter and areas to be covered on a 
schedule. Constantly revise the schedule 
according to your results. If you are 
normal, you will always fall short of your 
expectations. Worry not! 
